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1  OVERVIEW 
 
1.1  Working group 
Background 
ICT systems that are secure and meet the requirements concerning Finland’s security of 
supply are an essential prerequisite for businesses, government and the everyday transactions 
of citizens in Finland’s information society. The importance of ICT systems was emphasized 
in the 2004 Government report on Finnish security and defence policy, in the Government 
resolution on the strategy for securing the functions vital to society, issued in November 2006, 
and in the Government decision on safeguarding the security of supply, issued in August 
2008. Securing ICT systems in accordance with these decisions has required, and will 
continue to require, communications policy actions, steps by the Government and by 
businesses to ensure the security of supply, and actions by public authorities, especially those 
responsible for security, to secure their own critical systems. 
Establishment of working group 
On 15 January 2009, the Ministry of Transport and Communications established a working 
group to examine the means by which the availability of telecommunications networks that 
are secure and meet the requirements for security of supply can be promoted on the 
communications market. The working group’s term ended on 15 May 2009.  
The aim of the working group was to create a basis and alternative models for 
communications policy actions and other Government actions for promoting the availability 
of telecommunications networks and telecommunications services on the market, such that 
this would meet the need more effectively than at present for securing the functions vital to 
society, and especially to government, and for Finland’s security of supply. The working 
group was required to draft a description of the current state of affairs and of the envisioned 
future state. On the basis of this, the working group was also required to present proposals for 
alternative ways of achieving the envisioned future state and to evaluate the effects of these 
alternatives. The report had to include estimates of the financial and legislative implications of 
the measures and of their significance for economic growth and for developing innovations. 
Composition of working group 
Matti Lehti, Chancellor of the Helsinki School of Economics, was invited to be the working 
group’s chairman, and Harri Pursiainen, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, was designated vice chairman.  
The following were invited to be members of the working group: Risto Volanen, State 
Secretary at the Prime Minister’s Office, Raimo Luoma, Director General at the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy, Pekka Timonen, Director General of the Ownership Steering 
Department at the Prime Minister’s Office, Rauni Hagman, Director General of the Finnish 
Communications Regulatory Authority, and Ilkka Kananen, Managing Director of the 
National Emergency Supply Agency. Juhani Jokinen, Director General of the Finnish 
Competition Authority, was invited to be a permanent advisor, and he was given the 
opportunity to designate a deputy from the Finnish Competition Authority as necessary.  
Juhapekka Ristola, Director of the Communications Networks Unit, and Rauli Parmes, 
Director of Security and Office Services, both at the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications, were designated as secretaries for the working group.  
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The working group consulted the ministries that represent the authorities in charge of security 
and also, to the extent required by the scope of their remit, other public authorities, companies 
in the sector and other bodies. 
Concepts used by the working group and public access to its report 
Most of the working group’s report is public information. However, its detailed appendices 
are confidential on the basis of paragraphs 7, 8 and 20 of section 24 of the Act on the 
Openness of Government Activities. The working group has, for the most part, followed the 
established concepts used in the ICT sector. It has nevertheless used the terms 
communications network and telecommunications network to refer to the same concept, the 
choice of term depending on the context or the established usage. Similarly, when describing 
requirements, the concepts of secure network, secure system and meeting security of supply 
requirements have been used somewhat interchangeably.  
The working group was given the task of reporting on the means by which the availability of 
telecommunications networks that are secure and meet the requirements for security of supply 
can be promoted on the communications market. . 
Note on assessment of effects and international comparison 
In drawing up its report, the working group observed that any detailed analysis, particularly of 
the effects of various ownership policy alternatives, within the framework of the existing ICT 
market and public-sector bodies would have required more information than was available to 
the working group in the time allowed. On account of the nature of the subject at hand, it was 
also difficult to obtain detailed data for comparison purposes from other countries. 
Diagram: In any society characterized as an information society, the different network and information system services available 
must be optimised for the purpose in question and must complement each other. The diagram illustrates in approximate terms the 
desired state of network and information system services. 
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Having concluded its work the working group hereby respectfully submits its report to 
the Minister of Communications. 
  
Helsinki, 4 June 2009 
 
 
 
Matti Lehti, chairman  Harri Pursiainen, vice chairman 
 
 
Risto Volanen   Raimo Luoma 
 
 
Pekka Timonen  Rauni Hagman 
 
 
Ilkka Kananen   
 
 
Juhapekka Ristola, secretary  Rauli Parmes, secretary 
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1.2 Summary  
 
Aims of the work 
 
The working group defined the aims of its work as follows:  
 
ICT systems that are secure and meet the requirements concerning Finland’s security of 
supply are an essential prerequisite for businesses, government and the everyday transactions 
of citizens in Finland’s information society. Communications networks constitute an essential 
element in the networked infrastructure of society, and this has both direct and indirect effects 
on achievement of the fundamental aims concerning Finland’s security of supply.  
 
Basic communications services for citizens throughout the country are secured through 
communications policy. This policy is put into effect via legislation, operating permit 
regulations and other measures adopted by the authorities. The comprehensive availability of 
a diversity of communications networks and services can be secured most effectively by 
ensuring that the market functions efficiently, and especially by establishing and maintaining 
the right conditions for competition. Through competition, operators will have the incentive to 
innovate and to develop their business.  
 
By providing technical guidance for telecommunications operators and through monitoring, 
the aim is to ensure that communications networks that are secure and of a high technical 
standard are available to users of communications services.  
 
 Current state and development needs 
 
The working group assessed the current state and the development needs as follows:  
 
It was necessary to take a view concerning the protection of advanced critical infrastructure 
under exceptional circumstances and also during serious disruptive situations in normal 
circumstances, on account of the following factors: society has become more information-
intensive; foreign ownership has increased; functions are outsourced; ICT systems are more 
integrated and interdependent; usage of freely accessible information networks; and the 
greater dependence on electricity.  
 
A key principle in regulating Finland’s security of supply has been public-private partnership. 
The general security of communications networks and services is regulated by the 
Communications Market Act (393/2003) and the Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority’s regulations issued by virtue of the Act.  
 
Management of fixed telecommunications networks is the most critical aspect for securing 
functions vital to society and for the security of supply. Largely for historical reasons, the 
most important fixed networks by a wide margin are those of TeliaSonera Finland Plc.  
 
The communications infrastructure consumes a substantial amount of public resources. In 
April 2009, the Government decided to set up a security network project for the government 
sector. The project is aimed at introducing a secure telecommunications network and network 
services for the government sector, and especially for the authorities in charge of security. The 
state is a significant minority shareholder in the two largest national telecommunications 
operators, and it also has other telecommunications holdings. Furthermore, the state is a very 
significant purchaser of high-quality communications services. 
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The development needs of services that meet the requirements for security of supply are 
concerned with matters such as market efficiency, regulation of product purchases, ownership 
and control solutions, funding for ensuring critical functions, and increasing long-term 
coordination. There is also a need to ensure that the state or parties under its control have 
sufficient ownership or control authority of a permanent nature regarding the elements of the 
fixed telecommunications network most critical to the functioning of society. 
 
Proposals of the working group  
 
With due consideration to the aims of the work and having assessed the current state and development needs, 
the working group decided unanimously to propose that the following measures be taken:  
 
1. The National Emergency Supply Agency and the National Emergency Supply 
Organisation’s information society cluster should, by the end of 2011, conduct a thorough 
investigation of the global and multilateral process requirements concerning contingency 
preparations for exceptional circumstances and for serious disruptive situations in normal 
circumstances, and, on the basis of this investigation, draw up a plan concerning extensive 
mutual cooperation between the public and private parties concerned in order to enhance the 
information society’s ability to withstand serious disruptions.  
 
2. The legislation on contingency preparations for exceptional circumstances should be 
brought up to date in line with the basic elements of the Government proposal concerning the 
Emergency Powers Act. 
 
3. National security requirements should be included as a key component of the legislation 
regulating functions vital to society in normal circumstances. 
 
4. Under the direction of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, an investigation 
should be made of whether it is necessary, and even feasible in view of Finland’s international 
obligations, to enact new legislation for ensuring that it would be possible to monitor more 
effectively than at present the ownership base of companies that are important in terms of 
security of supply and national security in order to combat undesirable corporate takeovers.  
 
5. The Ministry of Transport and Communications should, by the end of 2010, draw up 
proposals for legislation to reduce more effectively than at present the risks to ICT systems, 
and to functions vital to society that depend on these systems, posed by serious disruptive 
situations in normal circumstances. 
 
6. Sufficient ownership and control authority of a permanent nature should be acquired for 
the state concerning at least those elements of the fixed telecommunications networks most 
critical to the functioning of society. This objective should be implemented in such a way 
that, to guarantee security, the amount of the state’s capital tied up in the ownership of 
telecommunications operators is as little as possible, and that the actions needed are targeted 
in such a way that they would not hinder the pursuit of a neutral communications policy.  
 
7. The Ministry of Transport and Communications should set up a standing committee of 
public servants, composed of representatives of the main ministries and other authorities, for 
the purpose of supporting and coordinating official tasks concerning the regulation of 
communications markets, the availability of electronic networks for public authorities, and the 
ownership policy with regard to communications operators. The work of the committee 
should be supported by the National Emergency Supply Organisation’s information society 
cluster. The committee would report on its actions regularly to the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications. The committee’s reports would also be discussed in the Government’s 
permanent secretaries’ meetings and by the committee on security and defence matters. 
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 8. In implementing the proposals set out above, the high security national information 
infrastructure produced by the security network project for the government sector should be 
utilised wherever possible. In addition, the requirements set out in the SOPIVA document on 
contract-based contingency preparations should be introduced throughout the government 
sector and in companies critical for the security of supply by the end of 2012. 
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2 AIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1  Importance of secure communications networks 
 
The functioning of ICT systems has become essential for ensuring the continuity of 
operations for all modern businesses and for the government sector. Considerable 
efficiency benefits have been derived and new investment opportunities emerged 
through the outsourcing of functions and through foreign ownership.  
 
A characteristic feature of Finland’s information society has been the very rapid 
changeover to mobile communications and to the use of broadband Internet 
connections. In the past ten years, the Internet, on-line banking, e-transactions and 
various electronic entertainment services have become central to the everyday lives of 
Finland’s citizens.  
 
It was necessary for the working group to take a view concerning the protection of 
advanced critical infrastructure under exceptional circumstances and also during 
serious disruptive situations of different kinds in normal circumstances, on account of 
the following factors: society has become more information-intensive; foreign 
ownership has increased; functions are outsourced; ICT systems are more integrated 
and interdependent; usage of freely accessible information networks; and the greater 
dependence on electricity.  
The working group defined the aims of its work as follows:  
 
ICT systems that are secure and meet the requirements concerning Finland’s security of 
supply are an essential prerequisite for businesses, government and the everyday 
transactions of citizens in Finland’s information society. Communications networks 
constitute an essential element in the networked infrastructure of society, and this has 
both direct and indirect effects on achievement of the fundamental aims concerning 
Finland’s security of supply.  
 
Basic communications services for citizens throughout the country are secured through 
communications policy. This policy is put into effect via legislation, operating permit 
regulations and other measures adopted by the authorities. The comprehensive 
availability of a diversity of communications networks and services can be secured most 
effectively by ensuring that the market functions efficiently, and especially by 
establishing and maintaining the right conditions for competition. Through competition, 
operators will have the incentive to innovate and to develop their business.  
 
By providing technical guidance for telecommunications operators and through 
monitoring, the aim is to ensure that communications networks that are secure and of a 
high technical standard are available to users of communications services.  
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Communications networks constitute an essential element in the networked 
infrastructure of society, and this has both direct and indirect effects on achievement 
of the fundamental aims concerning Finland’s security of supply. These aims are to 
secure the functioning of society, the livelihoods of citizens and the material 
preconditions for national defence. Public communications networks constitute a key 
foundation for the communications arrangements of all of the country’s public 
authorities, including those via dedicated communications networks.  
 
The Government decision on safeguarding the security of supply (no. 539/2008, 
issued 21 August 2008) specifies the objective of securing through contingency 
preparations the infrastructure essential for the functioning of society and ensuring the 
continuity of critical production under all circumstances. Formulated on the basis of 
this are the objectives for protecting ICT systems during serious disruptive situations 
in normal circumstances and under exceptional circumstances, including a state of 
defence.  
 
In April 2009, the Government decided to set up a security network project for the 
government sector. The project is aimed at introducing a secure telecommunications 
network and network services for the government sector, and especially for the 
authorities in charge of security, in accordance with the plan drawn up at the project 
planning stage. 
 
2.2  Communications policy objectives 
 
The underlying principle of Finland’s communications policy has traditionally been to 
guarantee the availability of high-quality and affordable communications services and 
to secure basic communications services for citizens throughout the country. The 
means for achieving this are legislation, operating permit regulations and certain other 
measures pursued by the authorities, and through close cooperation between the 
authorities and companies in the sector. The investment-intensive nature of the sector 
has necessitated a long-term approach to communications policy, with the emphasis 
on a period of at least the next ten years.  
 
The aim has always been that Finland’s communications legislation should be 
technology neutral, and that the quality, price and availability of services offered to 
users should be optimised. The central challenge of Finland’s communications policy 
is to create the right environment to encourage commercial suppliers to provide 
leading-edge services at reasonable prices while also ensuring the availability of basic 
communications services on the communications market regardless of where users are 
located in the country, even in cases where services are not commercially supplied.  
 
The comprehensive availability of a diversity of communications networks and 
services can be secured most effectively by ensuring that the market functions 
efficiently. Competition in the sector guarantees high-quality and reasonably priced 
services for users, establishes sufficient incentives for operators to develop networks 
and services, and ensures there are opportunities for new entrants in the market.  
 
For competition to be healthy and to function well the market mechanism must be 
continually in place, rewarding those companies which are able to produce goods or 
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services that are attractive (in terms of price, quality, availability or other aspects) to 
customers and consumers in their purchase decisions. Items produced on a market in 
which there is strong competition or the potential for such competition will meet the 
needs of customers and consumers in the best possible way. At the same time, society 
will incur the minimum of costs in striving to ensure the efficient use of economic 
resources.  
 
Through competition, companies will have the incentive to innovate and to develop 
their business. Competition will lead to better products and further development of 
production, while at the same time also leading to the withering and ultimately the 
disappearance from the market of companies that neglect or are unable to improve the 
efficiency of their business. This will perpetuate the process of renewal and 
regeneration within the economy and maintain the transfer of resources to their most 
productive use, which in turn creates additional wealth in society.  
 
By providing technical guidance for telecommunications operators and through 
monitoring, the aim is to ensure that communications networks that are secure and of 
a high technical standard are available to users of communications services.  
 
2.3  Parties involved and operating methods 
 
A key principle in developing Finland’s security of supply has been public-private 
partnership. In the future, the development of ICT services meeting the requirements 
concerning Finland’s security of supply will require ever more extensive cooperation. 
 
There is a long tradition of partnership between the public and private sectors in 
Finland. The new National Emergency Supply Organisation operates on this very 
basis. The National Emergency Supply Organisation includes a planning committee 
network of clusters and pools. The clusters, which focus on priority areas for 
Finland’s security of supply, are broad-based, sector-specific collaborating 
organisations consisting of experts representing the authorities, relevant bodies and 
the main parties involved. These collaborating organisations have the task of guiding, 
coordinating and monitoring the contingency preparations within their own particular 
sphere of the arrangements for the security of supply. The responsibility for the 
security of supply with regard to information society needs rests with the National 
Emergency Supply Organisation’s information society cluster. 
 
The Government decision on safeguarding the security of supply (539/2008) specifies 
the objective of securing through contingency preparations the infrastructure essential 
for the functioning of society and ensuring the continuity of critical production under 
all circumstances. Formulated on the basis of this are the objectives for protecting ICT 
systems during serious disruptive situations in normal circumstances and under 
exceptional circumstances, including a state of defence. The security of supply 
decision emphasizes the interdependence of different functions and the importance of 
international markets and networking for the country’s security of supply. Hence, the 
work concerning security of supply must focus ever more strongly on national 
networked cooperation and on understanding the international interdependencies and 
the related development of contingency preparation methods. 
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Under the Government resolution on the strategy for securing the functions vital to 
society (23 November 2006), society must be able to secure vital functions in all 
circumstances. Contingency preparations emphasize the importance of making 
arrangements and taking measures in times of normal circumstances. In particular, 
electronic communications, telecommunications and energy supply systems needed 
for leadership and for controlling vital functions must already be protected and 
secured during normal circumstances, ensuring that they can withstand the demands of 
different disruptive situations and exceptional circumstances.  
 
The Government resolution on the strategy for securing the functions vital to society 
requires that the ICT systems in use by organisations in society and by the general 
public are reliable and secure. The reliable operation of systems has been verified 
using appropriate methods and with the aid of the authorities concerned and through 
the cooperation of the companies involved. The data security of communications 
networks is in place; the basic level of security required by the legislation and 
regulations has been determined for communications services and basic technical 
systems; compliance with the regulations concerning the construction and 
maintenance of systems and the successful functioning of the services provided is 
monitored; the operating communications systems of the authorities in charge of 
security and those of the country’s leaders are efficient and coordinated; the 
government’s general data processing is secured; and the government sector’s 
electronic services, data management and data security are all controlled effectively.  
 
The Ministry of Transport and Communications is responsible for ensuring the 
operation of ICT systems. This means making sure that functions vital to society that 
are dependent on communications services, communications networks and other ICT 
systems are not jeopardized by disruptions in the operations of ICT systems. Through 
legislation, guidance, monitoring and cooperation, the aim is to ensure the 
construction, development and maintenance of appropriate ICT systems and to ensure 
as much as possible that they can be used to safeguard the data security of electronic 
communications and services and their usability by all service users.  
 
The authorities are prepared if necessary to control, regulate and classify networks and 
their services and user groups according to their importance. Guidance is issued on the 
contingency preparations of telecommunications operators, and the readiness of 
companies is tested through supervision, inspections and contingency planning drills. 
The work of the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority as the public 
authority with expertise and supervision responsibilities concerning protection of data 
in communications and data security matters is constantly being developed. Through 
national data security measures, cooperation between the EU’s data security bodies 
and agencies and international cooperation, the aim is to contribute towards ensuring 
that there is no threat to the use of Finland’s ICT systems from outside its borders. 
The increasing use of ICT systems is monitored to ensure that this does not jeopardise 
the secure control of functions in society. In ensuring the functioning of systems, 
developments in weapons technology are also taken into account. 
 
Under the Government Rules of Procedure (262/2003), the sphere of activity of the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications includes electronic communications and 
the data security of communications services. The sphere of the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy includes economic policy, the functioning of markets 
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and promotion of competition. The sphere of the Prime Minister’s Office includes 
public ownership policy concerning state majority-owned and associated companies. 
 
Under the Communications Market Act, the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications determines the groups of users who are entitled to use a public 
authority network. These user groups include representatives of the police, the 
Customs and the rescue authorities, as well as other comparable groups representing 
public authorities. Besides the authorities, the scope must exist for approving users 
who are persons not engaged in any public authority capacity but who are necessary 
and important for the achievement of special objectives referred to in the legislation. 
Such users could include individuals who are important for leadership in society, or 
representatives of various companies or other organisations who, in exceptional 
circumstances, would be charged with certain special tasks or who, even in normal 
circumstances, manage security tasks that are significant for the functioning of 
society. When approval is given for groups of users comprising persons other than 
those in public authorities, as referred to above, special attention should, however, be 
given to ensuring that these user groups do not become so large as to affect the 
operational prerequisites for public communications networks, thereby hindering 
competition on the communications market.  
 
On 8 April 2009, the Government set up a security network project for the government 
sector (known by its Finnish acronym TUVE). The project is aimed at introducing a 
secure telecommunications network and network services for the government sector, 
and especially for the authorities in charge of security, in accordance with the plan 
drawn up at the project planning stage. This project constitutes a security project. The 
ministries are responsible for the realisation of the project within their respective 
spheres of operation. A steering group is to be set up for the project and this group 
will later oversee the establishment of a project group. A project coordination group 
will also be set up later to aid the project group. The coordination group may set up 
cross-sectoral working groups under its direction on the recommendation of the 
steering group. The project began on 9 April 2009 and will be terminated on 31 
December 2011. A total of EUR 197,000,000 is allocated under the main expenditure 
title of the Ministry of Defence in the Government’s 2009 Budget for promoting 
network security in the government sector  
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2.4  Critical operating processes in Finland’s information society 
 
 
 
Diagram: The interconnections between information, operating processes and ICT systems are illustrated by the layers in the dia-
gram, where a higher layer almost without exception requires the services offered by at a lower level. Process data refers to in-
formation processed by the end user in the operating process. Infra-data refers to information that is copied and distributed for the 
purpose of combining or handling it with process information.  
 
 
 
 
In Finland’s information society, ICT plays two different roles in the activities of tele-
communications operators and organisations: an implementing role and an enabling 
role. ICT can be used to support and improve the efficiency of existing structures and 
processes. ICT can also enable new types of operating model and, in extreme cases, it 
could even change the structure of an entire industry. 
 
The operation of all intelligent systems is based on different levels of information. 
Systems need information on the world around them; they interpret this data within 
their own framework; and, through their actions or by distributing information, they 
have an impact on other systems. The structure of a system, in terms of the 
information it holds and processes, consists of its physical components, their 
relationship to each other, and the data stored in the system. The extent of 
computerised equipment and systems in Finland’s information society highlights the 
essential nature of information.  
 
The computer-based processes rely on various software applications, which at their 
simplest are off-the-shelf packages requiring no user-specific customisation. At the 
other extreme are extensive families of software applications, which can be complex 
and purpose-specific software packages.  
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Any information society will be reliant on information processes. Typically, the entire 
process must function successfully in order that a certain desired action or service is 
properly available. However, the more critical a specific function in the process, the 
greater will be its impact. In terms of the functioning of the information society, net-
work products and services constitute are a critical element of this. 
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3  CURRENT STATE AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS 
 
 
 
 
3.1  Current state  
 
3.1.1  Availability of communications networks and services  
 
The availability of communications networks can be divided on the basis of three 
different network categories: core networks, regional networks and access networks. 
The access network is the network to which end users connect; internal networks in 
buildings are also considered part of the access network. An often-used synonym is 
access technology. The following are examples of access networks or access 
technologies: fixed copper connections, cable television networks, optical fibres, 
The working group assessed the current state and the development needs as follows:  
 
It was necessary to take a view concerning the protection of advanced critical infrastructure 
under exceptional circumstances and also during serious disruptive situations in normal 
circumstances, on account of the following factors: society has become more information-
intensive; foreign ownership has increased; functions are outsourced; ICT systems are more 
integrated and interdependent; usage of freely accessible information networks; and the 
greater dependence on electricity.  
 
A key principle in regulating Finland’s security of supply has been public-private 
partnership. The general security of communications networks and services is regulated by 
the Communications Market Act (393/2003) and the Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority’s regulations issued by virtue of the Act.  
 
Management of fixed telecommunications networks is the most critical aspect for securing 
functions vital to society and for the security of supply. Largely for historical reasons, the 
most important fixed networks by a wide margin are those of TeliaSonera Finland Plc.  
 
The communications infrastructure consumes a substantial amount of public resources. In 
April 2009, the Government decided to set up a security network project for the government 
sector. The project is aimed at introducing a secure telecommunications network and 
network services for the government sector, and especially for the authorities in charge of 
security. The state is a significant minority shareholder in the two largest national 
telecommunications operators, and it also has other telecommunications holdings. 
Furthermore, the state is a very significant purchaser of high-quality communications 
services. 
 
The development needs of services that meet the requirements for security of supply are 
concerned with matters such as market efficiency, regulation of product purchases, 
ownership and control solutions, funding for ensuring critical functions, and increasing long-
term coordination. There is also a need to ensure that the state or parties under its control 
have sufficient ownership or control authority of a permanent nature regarding the elements 
of the fixed telecommunications network most critical to the functioning of society. 
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WLAN, GSM, UMTS, wireless broadband @450 and xDSL. The service coverage of 
individual access networks is usually relatively small.  
 
Access networks are connected to each other typically by combining a group of access 
networks into a regional network, also widely known as a metro network. Major 
customers can also connect directly to a metro network, and in doing so may be 
offered higher speed communications. Regional and access networks are used 
somewhat interchangeably. The term local network is used to refer normally to the 
fixed copper networks of regional telecommunications operators, through whose 
subscriber connections various communications services, such as broadband 
subscriptions, can be offered to users. 
 
The core network is a data transmission network connecting towns and cities and 
other municipalities, and different regional or access networks. At the core network 
level, services are based on the fixed optical core network, which covers all the most 
important population centres. The optical fibre core network includes backbone 
routers, the transmission links between them, and peripheral routers that use various 
technologies to connect the access networks to the core network. The task of the core 
network is to transfer data between access networks as rapidly and reliably as 
possible. 
 
 
Diagram: The diagram shows the logical structure of communications networks. The higher the layer in the structure, the closer 
it is to the individual user. The lower the layer, the greater the number of users concerned. Lower level services are needed in 
order that the upper level services which rely on them can function. The fixed telecommunications network nodes that are the 
most critical to society are located in the lower part of the diagram. 
 
There are five core networks in Finland, namely those of TeliaSonera, Elisa, DNA, 
TDC Oy and Finnet Group. Network coverage overlaps in the major urban areas, 
whereas in northeast and northern Finland there is only one core network, that of 
TeliaSonera.  
 
The core network nodes are found in the largest urban areas. These provide access 
points for local network connections or offer the opportunity to access national 
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services such as mobile and fixed network phone services and Internet and data 
connections. Those in control of core network connections can offer their customers 
corporate services with virtually nationwide coverage. Indeed it is via core networks 
that telecommunications operators can provide broadband services outside their own 
traditional geographical areas by leasing some of the network capacity of another 
party by means of DSLAM technology.  
 
In the biggest cities the telecommunications operators have begun to offer their own 
fast 100 Mbit/s optical fibre connections in their competitors’ territories, even 
obviating the need to lease copper connections from a local telecommunications 
operator. 
 
Besides competition between networks, the competition between technologies on the 
communications market is increasing, because broadband services, for instance, can 
be produced using DSL, cable, fibre or wireless technology, and phone services are 
produced via the traditional fixed network, a mobile network or with VoIP 
technology. Text-based communications can be transmitted by e-mail, SMS or instant 
messaging.  
 
Overall, the conclusion is that today’s competition-based communications market in 
Finland has been of great benefit to end users, especially in the broadband and mobile 
markets. By European standards, the uptake of services has been at a record pace, and 
prices are low in relation to those of countries featuring in comparisons.  
 
Developments in technology have also kept pace well by European standards: 3G 
services have been taken up quickly, and optical fibre networks are already available 
to users in the major urban areas. In mobile communications, services are provided on 
a competitive basis throughout the country, and competition exists in broadband 
services in all the bigger urban areas. At the end of 2010, wireless broadband with a 
speed of at least 1 Mbit/s will be available to 99.9% of the Finnish population. 
 
In services for corporate and institutional customers, competition has been even more 
successful than in consumer services. The telecommunications operators managing the 
core networks are able to offer a full range of communications services, at least to 
their biggest customers: fixed and mobile network phone services and various data 
services. In addition to communications services, telecommunications operators are 
often able to offer corporate and institutional customers other ICT services too, and 
also systems integration, because in practice communications services need to be 
integrated with the customer’s information systems, such as production and sales 
control systems. 
 
Functions requiring security of supply use not only public communications networks 
and the VIRVE public authority network, but also their own separate local, regional 
and national radio networks. These networks are found especially in the production, 
transmission and distribution of energy, in water supply, municipal engineering, 
transport logistics, production for the export industry, and in food supply. In terms of 
the legislation concerning the communications market, these are seen mainly as 
networks offered to a pre-restricted group of users, thus not constituting public 
telecommunications and not falling within the scope of the Communications Market 
Act, except in regard to the regulation of disruptions. 
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Management of fixed telecommunications networks is the most critical aspect for 
securing functions vital to society and for the security of supply. The most important 
fixed networks by a wide margin are those of TeliaSonera Finland Plc. The Elisa Oyj 
network is also of considerable significance. Of lesser significance, though still 
important, are the fixed networks of DNA Ltd and certain other telecommunications 
operators (Finnet, TDC). TeliaSonera Finland Plc is clearly the most important 
provider of broadband services in sparsely populated areas, and the effective 
implementation of the Government's broadband policy is in no small way dependent 
on the actions of the company.  
 
Both Appendix 2, concerning security networks, threat scenarios, contingency 
preparations and network structure in detail, and Appendix 3, concerning critical states 
and connections in detail, remain confidential on the basis of paragraphs 7, 8 and 20 
of section 24 of the Act on the Openness of Government Activities. 
 
3.1.2  Changes occurring in communications networks and markets 
 
Certain general tendencies are evident in the business decisions of telecommunications 
operators which could also affect the security of supply in regard to network and 
communications services. Various ownership and cooperation arrangements between 
telecommunications operators are continuing, and in electronic communications 
networks this could lead to larger companies operating nationwide in Finland or 
across several countries. This process will also give rise to more specialised operators. 
In addition, the ownership base of telecommunications operators is becoming more 
fragmented and more international. The establishment of greater international links 
can also be seen in the decisions to locate abroad the active components of 
communications networks and services. The growing demand for returns is also 
evident in the opportunities for investing in enhancing the security of communications 
networks and services to a standard above the minimum requirements set by law. 
 
Of special interest for the security of supply is the increase in subcontracting, for 
instance in network servicing, maintenance and repair work. The concentration of 
these activities has also led to the outsourcing of functions throughout the sector to 
just a handful of operators, which could be problematic for service availability in the 
event of a large-scale crisis. In subcontracting agreements, the clauses concerning 
security, responsibilities and information flow are not always sufficiently clear and 
comprehensive by any means.  
 
As a consequence of the growth in subcontracting, the specialisation of 
telecommunications operators and the emergence of separate network and service 
operators, the division of responsibilities in the service chain is becoming more 
fragmented. This, in turn, is adding to the need for greater expertise in procurement. In 
communications networks and services, reference is often made to end-to-end 
functionality, which refers to the interoperability of the networks and services of 
different operators. The same approach on a larger scale is also helpful in envisaging 
needs in regard to security of supply. 
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Clear trends in the development of technology include network integration, the spread 
of IP-based technology, and the wider use of wireless access networks and other new 
wireless applications. 
 
Communications services and access networks focus on the same core networks. 
Concentration is also occurring in hardware solutions and network management. 
Different networks can have common, centralised components and common hardware 
facilities. As communications networks become more integrated, services are 
becoming more vulnerable, because an individual fault can have a large scale impact 
on the operation and usability of communications networks and services. 
 
Solutions based on the Internet and on next generation networking (NGN) are being 
utilised in the production, distribution and management of communications services. 
These Internet and NGN models compete with each other to a certain extent. The 
Internet model is based on software installed in a terminal device, enabling global 
service provision to customers who are linked to the Internet. The operator-focused 
NGN model is based on the telecommunications operators having intelligent and 
functional networks and network equipment, guaranteeing service quality but at a 
significantly higher cost. 
 
Services are increasingly Internet-based, i.e. software-based. At the same time, IP-
based technology is gaining ground in communications services and in core networks: 
voice services, for example, are becoming IP-based, and core networks are using IP-
based MPLS technology for carrying traffic. IP-based services are susceptible to 
human error in specification setting, which can have major implications in an 
integrated network. 
 
Service vulnerability due to the increase in network integration and IP-based 
technology, together with the fragmentation occurring among providers, is making the 
management of faults and disruptions in communications networks more difficult. 
When a fault occurs, both the customer and the telecommunications operator can find 
it difficult to establish quickly the cause of the problem. In the operation of critical 
infrastructure, the usability of services and the continuity of operations must be 
ensured under all circumstances. To guard against faults and disruptions, the 
agreements made must take into account not only the various backup and contingency 
preparation arrangements but also the need for information flow to be as quick as 
possible and the need to be able to contact the right people quickly. 
 
The increase in IP technology and wireless networks and the fragmentation among 
providers will also add to the data security risks. Since functions that are critical for 
the security of supply are heavily reliant on public communications networks and 
services, their data security requirements are very considerable. This is primarily 
because the service chain can consist of a number of different operators, and the 
systems of operators that are critical for the security of supply can be exposed to 
threats emerging via the public network. Furthermore, providers of a minor service 
forming part of a large service entity are not necessarily able to meet data security 
requirements in full. 
 
In the local networks of companies and other organisations, cable networks that are 
expensive to install and maintain are being replaced with less costly wireless sensor 
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networks. Another new technology, radio frequency identification (RFID), is allowing 
many new logistics applications in industry, commerce and transportation. The use of 
these technologies will become more widespread over the next few years. 
 
Along with the changes in technology, climate change could also have an impact on 
the security of communications networks and services if there is an increase in 
weather phenomena that cause disruptions, such as storms and floods. Tolerance of 
normal climate-related disruptions is already part of the basic requirements for the 
technical standard of communications networks and services, but any increase in 
disruptions will have an impact, especially on the provision of services that meet the 
requirements concerning Finland’s security of supply. 
 
There are many critical components in communications networks and services. These 
can include telecommunications terminal devices, network products and services, and 
access and other communications services. The physical location of equipment and 
systems is also of major significance for security. The facilities in which equipment is 
housed and the appropriate protection of those facilities are of particularly acute im-
portance when they are used by a number of different parties.  
 
The security-critical components and factors referred to above are all concentrated in 
the same core networks. For everything to function reliably, it is essential that the 
main fixed telecommunications networks continue to operate under all circumstances. 
For this reason it is the security of fixed telecommunications networks that represents 
the most critical aspect in Finland’s information society. 
 
There is no sign of any developments in consumer behaviour or in the provision of 
communications services that would have a particular impact on Finland’s security of 
supply. The most significant change occurring internally is that traditional 
communications services are being offered via the Internet at lower prices than before, 
and even at no charge. Competition in services is becoming separate from network 
competition, and service provision is becoming more global. Many consumers are 
now using Finnish or foreign IP-based services (Gmail, Skype, Messenger) that are 
low cost or free of charge. There is also an increase in community-based on-line 
activity, not only in the sharing of content but also of infrastructure. Some of these 
services are beyond the reach of Finnish communications market regulation, either 
because the technical provision is independent of any telecommunications operator or 
because the provider is located, and the service provided, abroad. 
 
In traditional communications services it is noteworthy that, in addition to the long-
observed high level of penetration in mobile subscriptions, there has been 
considerable growth in broadband subscriptions, transfer to wireless services, and a 
continuous reduction in fixed phone network subscriptions.  
 
The need to ensure the availability and usability of the frequency resources of most 
importance for the security of supply is also an area that requires international 
cooperation. The availability of the new broadband radio networks requires 
harmonised frequency solutions that are regional or global. At both the global and the 
European level there are also projects emerging around the world that could, when in 
operation, have an adverse effect on the usability of frequencies in Finland. It is thus 
essential to contribute to the preparations for international decision-making on 
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frequencies, to follow the work on this via the ITU and CEPT working groups, and to 
respond to projects at a sufficiently early stage. 
 
It is also essential to ensure that the radio network frequencies of parties safeguarding 
Finland’s security of supply are protected from disruption. The need for protection is 
particularly acute in regard to using the radio system frequencies of public authorities 
and of certain businesses, and those used in aviation, shipping, meteorology and 
energy supply. Public authorities recognise a need to improve the efficiency of their 
actions in combating threats of different kinds, and this emphasizes the importance of 
secure communications systems. 
 
3.1.3  Legislation 
 
The general security of communications networks and services is regulated by the 
Communications Market Act (393/2003) and in the Finnish Communications 
Regulatory Authority’s regulations issued by virtue of the Act. The Communications 
Market Act (section 128) sets out the fundamental duty to plan, build and maintain 
communications networks and services in such a manner that they can withstand 
normal climatic, mechanical and electromagnetic interference and function as reliably 
as possible even in disruptive situations under normal circumstances and in 
exceptional circumstances.  
 
In section 129 of the Act, the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority is 
authorised to regulate in more detail the various technical quality and interoperability 
considerations in communications networks and services, as given in the 21-item list 
set out in the section. Regulation number 54 of the Authority, on the protection of 
communications networks and services, is key in ensuring security. It obligates 
telecommunications operators to attach a priority rating to their systems and system 
components and to ensure that they have properly functioning equipment, power 
supply and physical security arrangements, and to organise reserve routes in 
accordance with the rating. The priority rating is based on the number of users 
affected by any malfunctioning element or on the size of geographical area concerning 
the user services affected, or on the type of services affected. The special needs of 
individual users therefore have no effect on the priority rating or the contingency 
preparation obligations. Within this regulatory framework, products meeting the 
requirements concerning security of supply must emerge on market terms. Chapter 9 
of the Communications Market Act sets out provisions concerning 
telecommunications operators’ contingency preparations for exceptional 
circumstances. 
 
Parties offering information system services are not subject to such contingency 
preparation obligations. Legislative opportunities for reducing the effects of serious 
disruptions under normal circumstances are currently very limited. 
 
3.1.4  International comparison 
 
The supply of and demand for communications networks that are secure and meet the 
requirements for Finland’s security of supply are strongly linked to the need to ensure 
national security and the country’s capacity to function. Hence, most information on 
the subject is naturally confidential and is available to only a limited circle even 
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within the country. Obtaining detailed international comparison data is practically 
impossible. However, through public information sources and direct contacts it is 
possible to obtain general information and to identify certain basic principles in the 
different national approaches. 
 
In the European Union, the issue has been dealt with in various different contexts, the 
latest being a Commission communication concerning critical information infrastruc-
ture protection (COM 2009/149). This stresses prevention, contingency planning and 
awareness, and specifies a series of direct measures for improving the security and re-
silience of critical information infrastructure. The communication’s purpose is to help 
develop European policy to bolster security and reliability in an information society 
framework. The communication states that enhancing the security and resilience of 
critical information infrastructure will require the resolution of a number of chal-
lenges, among them the incoherent and uncoordinated nature of the different national 
approaches, the need for a new European management model for critical information 
infrastructure, Europe’s limited advance warning and response readiness, and interna-
tional cooperation. 
 
One existing element in regional cooperation at international level is the Meridan 
process (http://www.meridian2007.org), in which Finland is one of the countries 
involved. This is a restricted forum for national governments, set up for the exchange 
of confidential information on matters related to securing critical information 
infrastructure.  
 
In planning the measures for enhancing the security of supply of communications 
networks, it is important to take factors such as the following into account: a) the key 
functions that should be protected; b) threats concerning the key functions; and c) the 
structure of communications networks and markets as part of the critical 
infrastructure. As these factors can vary from one country to the next, the usefulness 
of detailed international comparison data is questionable, even if this were available. 
 
Many countries have drawn up strategies for securing critical infrastructure and 
critical information infrastructure. These strategies identify the critical nature of the 
infrastructure in terms of the functions vital to society, and the threats concerning 
infrastructure. Scattered information gathered from public information sources 
indicates that definition of the interdependencies between critical functions and 
critical infrastructures in society has been a common challenge. Many countries have 
found that at a general level there is a strong interdependence between energy supply 
and communications networks, for instance, but a closer analysis of this is not 
available from public information sources. 
 
Financing, administrative and legislative models differ between countries. Although 
detailed information on different countries is not available, the models can be divided 
as follows in terms of their main principles: 1) obligations for securing functions have 
been established for those parties that are critical for the functioning of society. The 
costs are the responsibility of the parties themselves; 2) obligations for securing 
functions have been established for those parties that are critical for the functioning of 
society. The costs are reimbursed in full or in part; 3) obligations for securing 
functions have been established for telecommunications operators offering 
telecommunications connections to parties that are critical for the functioning of 
  
 
24
society. The costs are met in full by the telecommunications operator; 4) obligations 
for securing functions have been established for telecommunications operators 
offering telecommunications connections to parties that are critical for the functioning 
of society. The costs are reimbursed in full or in part. 
 
On the basis of information obtained from Sweden’s Post and Telecom Agency, the 
following can be concluded about developments in the security of supply of Sweden’s 
communications networks. Previously resources were devoted to the functioning of 
communications networks in order to secure the resource needs of the country’s 
defence forces in a crisis situation. The Agency has drawn up a new strategy on the 
robustness of communications networks and the prevention of weaknesses in the 
networks. The aim of the strategy is to maintain and improve the functioning and 
robustness of communications services. Peacetime crises must not be allowed to lead 
to major interruptions and disruptions in communications networks. Major adverse 
effects should be avoided in crisis situations, and there should be an opportunity to 
take into account changes in the security situation every 5-10 years. The objectives are 
to be achieved through cooperation between the government and operators.  
 
The tools for coordination in Sweden are information exchange, joint crisis drills and 
shared systems. Resources are also devoted to training, and the country is an active 
participant in standardisation efforts and international cooperation. To enhance the 
robustness of the network, a proposal has been made for increasing the number of 
nodes in the fixed network. Additional network connection points are also considered 
necessary, so that different operator networks could be connected, if required, and 
traffic volumes balanced out. The strategy states that exchanges and other network 
equipment should be located in better protected premises with a power supply that is 
secure in crisis situations. 
 
Under the legal provisions of a decree, network operators with a turnover exceeding 
SEK 30 million and with networks that are significant have to pay the Agency a 
contingency planning charge. Through this charge a sum of approximately SEK 100 
million is collected annually. The charge is a maximum of 0.04% of the company’s 
turnover. In addition, the state can, if necessary, grant budget funding channelled via 
the Agency. The Agency purchases the necessary services from the private sector. 
 
3.1.5  Government investment in the ICT sector 
 
The ICT infrastructure consumes a substantial amount of public resources. Examples 
include:  
 
1) the state owns 13.72% of TeliaSonera AB (via Solidium), which, on 31 March 
2009, was equivalent to EUR 2,224.1 million; 
 
2) in the third supplementary budget of 2008, a total of EUR 196 million was 
allocated for the purchase of Elisa Plc shares; the state owns 9.62% of Elisa Plc, 
which, on 10 May 2009, was equivalent to EUR 166.5 million; 
 
3) in a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy in December 2008, the 
Government decided that the amount of broadband subsidy for telecommunications 
operators should be a total of EUR 66 million for the period 2010-2015; 
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4) under the 2009 budget submission a sum of EUR 197 million is to be used for the 
construction of a state security network;  
 
5) the state owns 60% (2007) of Corenet Ltd (via VR Ltd). The company’s turnover 
was EUR 31.4 million;  
 
6) the state owns 100% of State Security Networks Ltd. The company’s turnover was 
EUR 26 million; and 
 
7) the government authorities in charge of security, and other public authorities, have 
their own extensive communications networks and information systems. 
 
Furthermore, the state is a very significant purchaser of high-quality communications 
services. 
 
3.2  Development needs 
 
3.2.1  Identifying parties that are critical for the security of supply 
 
The parties critical for security of supply are all different in terms of their importance, 
size and resources. In securing network and communications services that meet the 
requirements concerning Finland’s security of supply, the first step is to identify the 
parties that are critical for security of supply and which elements of their activities are 
critical. It is then possible to identify which element of the operations is dependent on 
the communications network or service. A party that is critical for security of supply 
does not necessarily see itself in this role. Furthermore, the existence of a chain of 
subcontractors may mean that the critical nature of some part of the chain is not 
necessarily recognised. 
 
Taking into consideration the security of a service when procuring communications 
services and networks requires a degree of expertise. A party that is critical for the 
security of supply needs information about both its own needs and the services 
available if it is to be able to use security and quality as procurement and tendering 
criteria. Parties also need to be able to assess overall whether they can rely on one 
solution or the solutions of a single service provider, or whether they should acquire 
several, mutually verifying services. A service that meets the requirements for the 
security of supply is a package consisting of, for instance, special electrical and 
physical security of network components, organisational security of the service 
provider, knowledge of the entire service chain, and the customer service level (e.g. 
ease of contacting appropriate persons) 
 
3.2.2  Cooperation 
 
The development of network and communications services that meet the requirements 
concerning Finland’s security of supply requires the cooperation of all concerned. In 
the public and private sectors the needs of the parties involved must be analysed, their 
awareness of the communications infrastructure must be enhanced, and demand must 
be focused on communications network and service features that best serve security of 
supply. This may best succeed through well-coordinated cooperation between 
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telecommunications operators, the parties critical for security of supply, and the 
authorities. The cooperation among public authorities is especially reliant on the 
extent of any public funding concerning facilities, structures and features of 
communications networks and services, because the competition angle and 
government sector cost pressures must be taken into consideration in this. 
 
The introduction of technical or service configurations designed to enhance the 
security of supply can in some cases be more effectively promoted on a centralised 
basis rather than merely through agreements of individual parties. Procurement could, 
for instance, be centralised, focusing on a number of parties that are critical for 
security of supply. Procurement could be simply coordinated in the form of joint 
purchasing or it could also be financed from public funds.  
 
In general terms, the tools for developing services that meet the requirements 
concerning Finland’s security of supply include more effective marketing, regulation 
of products available, ownership solutions and financing. 
 
3.2.3  Utilising market mechanisms 
 
In developing the supply of services that meet the requirements concerning Finland’s 
security of supply, as much use as possible must be made of marketing mechanisms in 
order that services are produced cost-efficiently.  
 
Services that are tailored and verified on the basis of commercial principles could take 
into consideration requirements for security of supply that exceed the basic level 
associated with services available on the market. The first precondition for improving 
the efficiency of transactions is to enhance the awareness of parties critical for the 
security of supply about their own roles and about which of their functions are critical 
to society at large. The demand for and supply of secure services can be boosted if 
purchasers have at their disposal pre-prepared information on the service’s security 
features, and if telecommunications operators have at their disposal pre-prepared 
model contracts. 
 
In the SOPIVA project, launched in 2005 jointly by the National Emergency Supply 
Organisation’s information network, IT and electronics pools, a study was made of 
contract-based contingency preparations in the information society cluster. The focus 
was on establishing contracts for business profitability assessments, and emphasis was 
given to the fact that security means improving the basic level of network security.  
 
3.2.4  Legislation 
 
The main administrative branches of government should formulate legislative projects 
for political consideration that could be used to create the conditions for minimising 
more effectively than at present the effects of serious disruptions under normal 
circumstances on functions vital to society. Bringing the legal provisions up to date in 
line with the general legislation on security of supply and the competition legislation 
would be a way of improving the security of supply of communications networks and 
services in situations in which the market cannot produce adequate services. 
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Via the mechanisms of the legislation on security of supply it should be possible to 
identify and name the parties and functions that are critical for the security of supply. 
The legislation on the communications market would be the most natural place for the 
necessary instruments for establishing rights and obligations in regard to 
communications networks. The alternatives to establishing obligations would be 
company-specific resolutions and general obligations set out in legal provisions, for 
instance on contingency preparations for certain service provision. In addition, there 
may be a need for the legislation on security of supply and on the communications 
market to set out grounds consistent with the competition legislation for cost 
reimbursement and the exercise of authority. A very significant factor in developing 
the security of supply of networks and services in practice is the allocation of 
responsibility for the costs of security of supply.  
 
The legislation on contingency preparations for exceptional circumstances should be 
brought up to date in line with the basic elements of the Government proposal 
(3/2008) concerning the Emergency Powers Act. The Government proposal states that 
under exceptional circumstances it is essential to secure the supply of communications 
services because the importance of communications is merely heightened in a crisis 
situation. Most of the functions vital to society are today dependent on the functioning 
of ICT systems. The functions vital to society include power and water distribution, 
financial services, energy production facilities, data transmission and other services in 
a key position during a crisis without which citizens and businesses could not 
function.  
 
Under the provisions set out in the Government proposal, the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications could, with the purpose of ensuring well-functioning ICT 
systems and securing functions vital to society under exceptional circumstances, 
decide to obligate a telecommunications operator to produce network and 
communications services and to provide public authorities with a status report on the 
use of these services, to obligate a telecommunications operator to produce 
communications services in a certain geographical area or to produce certain services 
such as maintenance of mobile networks; or, if exceptional circumstances prevail, 
obligate a telecommunications operator to keep communications networks in good 
condition or build or refrain from building communications networks, or connect one 
communications network to another or to dismantle a connection; or obligate a 
telecommunications operator to cut network connections or communications service 
connections to a certain country or to international network and communications 
services for a defined period or until further notice.  
 
The requirements of national security should be incorporated as a key element of 
legislation for normal circumstances where the effects of this legislation are felt in 
functions vital to society.  
 
The Government proposal for legislation on auctions for certain radio frequencies 
(37/2009) includes a proposed procedure by which operating permits would always be 
granted to the highest bidder. However, at the same time it is proposed that there be a 
provision to the effect that an operating permit would not be granted or its transfer 
approved if there is justified cause to suspect that the granting or transfer would have 
an adverse effect on national security. For the purpose of assessing the effects on 
national security, the Government could request opinions on the matter from, for 
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instance, the Finnish Defence Forces or the Finnish Security Police, to supplement its 
own assessment. Corresponding provisions should also be incorporated in other key 
items of legislation for normal circumstances. 
 
3.2.5  State ownership in the communications market 
 
The state’s ownership interests are nowadays concerned both with finances and 
ownership consolidation goals. The state does not, however, have any control or 
influence over the functions that are genuinely the focus of its ownership interest. Put 
another way, the state owns shares in the parent companies of telecommunications 
operators that own networks but has no direct control over these operators’ 
communications networks. 
 
Nevertheless, the state’s highest level of leadership and other authorities in charge of 
security under the crisis management arrangements, such as the Finnish Defence 
Forces and authorities responsible for public order and security (e.g. the police and the 
Finnish Border Guard and the rescue authorities), must have at their disposal a 
security network with a high protection rating. There is also a need to ensure that the 
state or bodies under its control always have sufficient ownership or control authority 
regarding the elements of the fixed telecommunications network most critical to the 
functioning of society. 
 
The state’s ownership interests can of course change over time. The debate currently 
in progress emphasizes communications networks rather than service operators. 
Though this is closely in line with ownership policy and its main focus areas, it does 
not fully correspond to the prevailing situation. In the future, it would be more natural 
for the state to be involved in the ownership of infrastructure than the ownership of 
commercial parties that utilise the infrastructure. Correspondingly, most of the state’s 
non-financial ownership interests in telecommunications operators engaged in service 
activities would be removed if the main network infrastructure were separated from 
those engaged in service activities, or if other solutions were introduced that would 
secure the continuity of vigorous service competition. 
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4  PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT MEASURES AND THEIR EFFECTS IN BRIEF 
 
With due consideration to the aims of the work and having assessed the current state and 
development needs, the working group decided unanimously to propose that the following measures 
be taken:  
 
1. The National Emergency Supply Agency and the National Emergency Supply 
Organisation’s information society cluster should, by the end of 2011, conduct a 
thorough investigation of the global and multilateral process requirements concerning 
contingency preparations for exceptional circumstances and for serious disruptive 
situations in normal circumstances, and, on the basis of this investigation, draw up a 
plan concerning extensive mutual cooperation between the public and private parties 
concerned in order to enhance the information society’s ability to withstand serious 
disruptions.  
 
Such an investigation would support the legislative projects by 
producing empirical information, particularly on network 
interdependencies the identification of which is essential for ensuring 
security. Function-specific pilot investigations would also support the 
process of planning the necessary cooperation.  
 
Cooperation is one of the important factors in terms of managing the 
functions vital to society in situations where society is threatened by a 
serious event. Even where a serious disruption is already occurring, 
cooperation to restore a level of equilibrium to the management of the 
situation is essential, too. Preliminary planning would guarantee that 
the cooperating parties are able to react and function in accordance 
with known operating models. This is a matter of both anticipatory 
planning for continuity and furtherance of the recovery process.  
 
The investigation would also provide a description of how the functional 
capacity of the authorities can be strengthened in managing disruptive 
situations in communications networks and services and in assembling a 
status report and providing information about it. An appropriate status 
report would also be of key importance for minimising the adverse 
effects of disruptive situations and for accelerating the recovery from 
such situations. Progress reports on the investigation must be submitted 
to the standing committee of public servants referred to below. 
    
Drawing up a plan that can be implemented requires extensive expertise 
on the part of those concerned as well as their commitment to the 
project, and also an openness to finding new ways of resolving issues. 
The collaborative planning undertaken by the National Emergency 
Supply Organisation could be utilised in the work of the standing 
committee of public servants proposed below. 
 
 No extraordinary financial or legislative impacts are anticipated with 
this proposed measure.  
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2. The legislation on contingency preparations for exceptional circumstances should 
be brought up to date in line with the basic elements of the Government proposal 
concerning the Emergency Powers Act. 
 
The Government proposal concerning a new Emergency Powers Act 
(3/2008) was presented to Parliament in February 2008. The proposal 
includes additional and respecified powers for the authorities, in part to 
bring these powers into line with the threat scenarios posed, as required 
by the strategy for securing functions vital to society.  
 
The renewal of the Emergency Powers Act is of primary importance. The 
existing Emergency Powers Act contains no separate provisions on ICT 
systems. It is expected that the revision of the regulations in the 
Emergency Powers Act will clarify and ease the efforts of the authorities 
to plan and make contingency preparations for exceptional 
circumstances.  
 
Under the provisions set out in the Government proposal, the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications could, with the purpose of ensuring 
well-functioning ICT systems and securing functions vital to society 
under exceptional circumstances, decide to obligate a 
telecommunications operator to produce network and communications 
services and to provide public authorities with a status report on the use 
of these services; obligate a telecommunications operator to produce 
communications services in a certain geographical area or to produce 
certain services such as maintenance of mobile networks; or, if 
exceptional circumstances prevail, obligate a telecommunications 
operator to keep communications networks in good condition or build or 
refrain from building communications networks, or connect one 
communications network to another or to dismantle a connection; or 
obligate a telecommunications operator to cut network connections or 
communications service connections to a certain country or to 
international network and communications services for a defined period 
or until further notice.  
 
The Emergency Powers Act will not give rise to any significant costs in 
normal circumstances, though the costs that would be incurred would be 
in contingency preparations for exceptional circumstances, such as 
contingency planning drills and drawing up contingency plans. The 
proposed Emergency Powers Act would not alter the scope of the 
contingency preparation obligation, and so the costs of such 
preparations are not expected to change from the present situation. In 
addition, the contingency preparation obligation under the Emergency 
Powers Act would in future continue to apply only to public sector 
bodies. 
 
Under exceptional circumstances, in which the powers conferred by the 
Emergency Powers Act would apply, the Act could have quite significant 
financial implications, depending on the type of exceptional 
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circumstances in question. An accurate assessment of these costs is not 
possible, however. 
 
Discussion of the Government proposal for a new Emergency Powers 
Act will continue in Parliament during the next parliamentary session. 
 
3. National security requirements should be included as a key component of the 
legislation regulating functions vital to society in normal circumstances. 
 
Finland’s security of supply will improve with legislation which ensures 
that communications networks and services meet national security 
requirements. This would mean that communications networks and 
services are reliable and that they function reliably both in disruptive 
situations in normal circumstances as well as under the exceptional 
circumstances referred to in the Emergency Powers Act.  
 
This aim is already incorporated in the Government proposal for 
legislation on auctions for certain radio frequencies (37/2009), which 
includes a proposed procedure by which operating permits would 
always be granted to the highest bidder. However, it is also proposed 
that there be a provision to the effect that an operating permit would not 
be granted or its transfer approved if there is justified cause to suspect 
that the granting or transfer would have an adverse effect on national 
security. For the purpose of assessing the effects on national security, 
the Government could request opinions on the matter from, for instance, 
the Finnish Defence Forces or the Finnish Security Police.  
 
4. Under the direction of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, an 
investigation should be made of whether it is necessary, and even feasible in view of 
Finland’s international obligations, to enact new legislation for ensuring that it would 
be possible to monitor more effectively than at present the ownership base of 
companies that are important in terms of security of supply and national security in 
order to combat undesirable corporate takeovers.  
 
In some EU member states and in Russia, for instance, there are 
restrictions on foreigners owning companies that are strategic in terms 
of the functioning of society. In the case of Russia, a foreigner is only 
permitted to own less than half of the share capital of a 
telecommunications operator. 
 
In Finland, an examination of the need for and feasibility of similar 
arrangements should be conducted. 
 
5. The Ministry of Transport and Communications should, by the end of 2010, draw 
up proposals for legislation to reduce more effectively than at present the risks to ICT 
systems, and to functions vital to society that depend on these systems, posed by 
serious disruptive situations in normal circumstances. 
 
In situations where problems are specifically concerned with the 
functioning of ICT systems, the powers under the proposed new 
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Emergency Powers Act would only be available under exceptional 
circumstances, where the situation regarding security in society is 
already extremely serious.  
 
The powers concerning normal circumstances as they are understood 
today could prove insufficient in serious disruptive situations. This could 
in turn greatly jeopardise the operation of functions vital to society.  
 
Contingency preparations must be made in advance, in normal 
circumstances, and they must therefore be based on legislation applying 
to normal circumstances, the continued development of which is 
essential. A project should be launched in which new provisions 
applicable to normal circumstances ensure the establishment of clearly 
defined powers in order that the necessary measures for managing a 
threat caused by serious disruptive situations, or for managing the 
situation itself if this is already at hand, can be launched as quickly and 
efficiently as possible. This would further the aims for security of supply 
such that functions vital to society could, not only under exceptional 
circumstances but also in serious disruptive situations, be maintained as 
close to their normal state as possible, and that the effects of a serious 
disruptive situation could be reduced and management of those effects 
improved. 
 
There could be a considerable need for change concerning statutes 
pertaining to the legislation on communications policy, because the 
current regulations concern contingency preparations for normal and 
exceptional circumstances. Currently the regulations do not cover the 
‘grey area’ in which the exceptional circumstances referred to in the 
Emergency Powers Act are not yet relevant but where the situation is so 
serious that government actions are absolutely critical.  
 
The proposed measure could have financial implications in areas 
covered by the obligations of the new legislation. 
 
6. Sufficient ownership and control authority of a permanent nature should be 
acquired for the state concerning at least those elements of the fixed 
telecommunications networks most critical to the functioning of society. This 
objective should be implemented in such a way that, to guarantee security, the amount 
of the state’s capital tied up in the ownership of telecommunications operators is as 
little as possible, and that the actions needed are targeted in such a way that they 
would not hinder the pursuit of a neutral communications policy.  
 
The working group assessed three quite different approaches to 
ownership policy.  
 
For each approach the following were specified: the main actions, the 
effects on security of supply, the financial effects, the need for legislative 
changes, and the effects on economic growth and innovation.  
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Common to the alternatives is that each could be used to promote the 
availability of communications networks that are secure and meet the 
requirements concerning Finland’s security of supply. The alternatives 
differ from one another considerably, especially in regard to the amount 
of capital investment from the state and the impact of competition. 
 
The working group concluded by proposing that a single alternative be 
consistently pursued. Appendix 1 is confidential on the basis of 
paragraphs 7, 8 and 20 of section 24 of the Act on the Openness of 
Government Activities. 
 
7. The Ministry of Transport and Communications should set up a standing committee 
of public servants, composed of representatives of the main ministries and other 
authorities, for the purpose of supporting and coordinating official tasks concerning 
the regulation of communications markets, the availability of electronic networks for 
public authorities, and the ownership policy with regard to communications operators. 
The work of the committee should be supported by the National Emergency Supply 
Organisation’s information society cluster. The committee would report on its actions 
regularly to the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The committee’s reports 
would also be discussed in the Government’s permanent secretaries’ meetings and by 
the committee on security and defence matters. 
 
Cooperation among the various parties would ensure sufficient and 
comprehensive action to be undertaken in the communications sector 
with the aim of ensuring the security of supply. Efforts would need to be 
made to minimise overlaps between the different measures. 
 
The measure presented here would accomplish this in regard to the 
security of supply, thus avoiding unnecessary use of public resources. 
The committee’s collaborative work could also further the search for 
policy solutions that are of significance for the security of supply and 
which could be used to better safeguard the functions vital to society in 
securing the functioning of ICT systems by means other than committing 
state capital.  
It is also important to begin producing information that would allow a 
detailed analysis particularly of the effects of various ownership policy 
alternatives, within the framework of the existing ICT market and 
public-sector bodies.  
 
This proposed measure is expected at most to lead only to a need for 
technical amendments to the legislation. 
 
 8. In implementing the proposals set out above, the national information 
infrastructure produced by the security network project for the government sector and 
based on a high level of contingency preparation should be utilised wherever possible. 
In addition, the requirements set out in the SOPIVA document on contract-based 
contingency preparations should be introduced throughout the government sector and 
in companies critical for the security of supply by the end of 2012. 
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The security network project for the government sector and the project’s 
impacts are discussed elsewhere. 
 
The principal impact of contract-based contingency preparations would 
arise from the fact that a mechanism would be included in normal ICT 
system commercial supply and procurement chains with which the 
system’s security would be ensured throughout and at each stage in the 
chain.  
 
In the invariably changing production networks for information system 
services, the delivery performance of service production requires that its 
continuity is systematically managed across the entire service 
production network, including support services. The security of supply 
will improve when contingency preparations are included at an early 
stage in contracts, and when there is a considerable increase in society’s 
awareness of the aims of security of supply. 
 
This proposed measure would not give rise to the need for legislative 
amendments but it could have financial implications as the quality of 
production chains is improved. 
 
